Emergency Powers in Response to COVID-19: Policy Diffusion, Democracy, and Preparedness

Abstract

During the COVID-19 pandemic many states have resorted to proclaiming a state of emergency (SOE), expanding executive powers and curtailing civil liberties. Why have some states have declared SOEs when others have not? Our legal analysis suggests that although international law provides states with the option of declaring an SOE and derogating from human rights obligations to ensure the life of the nation, other ways to handle the pandemic without declaring an SOE do exist. Our theoretical analysis leads to three main propositions centred on the impact of regional diffusion, democratic institutions, and pandemic preparedness. Our empirical analysis combines a range of quantitative data sources to analyse the SOE decisions of 180 states during the first half of 2020. The results suggest that states’ declarations of SOEs are driven by both external and internal factors. A permissive regional environment, characterised by many simultaneously declared SOEs, may reduce the reputational and political costs of emergency powers, making their employment more palatable. At the same time, internal characteristics, specifically democratic institutions and pandemic preparedness, have shaped governments’ decisions. Weak democracies with poor preparedness have been considerably more likely to opt for an SOE than dictatorships and robust democracies with higher preparedness.