This articles examines the debate, and sometimes lack of debate, over nuclear issues in NATO from the beginning of the alliance to the mid-1960s and reveals how American officials changed their approach to deal with NATO’s nuclear issues. In the 1950s, US officials released only limited information about nuclear weapons that were a part of NATO’s war plans. Gradually, they determined that some of NATO’s major tensions stemmed from their allies’ lack of information about the extent of the US nuclear arsenal and its intended uses. After several halting steps, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara decided that US interests could be best met by offering the allies a nuclear education.
Sayle, T. A. (2020). A nuclear education: the origins of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group. Journal of Strategic Studies, 43(6–7), 920–956. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2020.1818560