Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Building Development Dynamic System under Government Regulation: From the Perspective of the Contractor

6Citations
Citations of this article
9Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

This article is free to access.

Abstract

To speed up the development of green buildings (GB) and meet the requirements of low energy consumption, low carbon dioxide emissions, and green sustainable development, the key is to build a high-efficient green building dynamic system (GBDS). The government, the developer, and the contractor are the main power of GB promotion, and they are the main participants of GBDS. This paper aims to study how to improve the motivation of contractors' investment and participation in GB under the government regulation measures, to make up for the gap of research on the contractor's dynamic mechanism in the GBDS. In the research, evolutionary game theory was applied to build a dynamic model of the evolutionary game among the government, the developer, and the contractor, and the evolutionary laws and stability strategies of their game behaviors were analyzed. The research results show that the contractor's motivation of building GBs depends on the sum of receipts after the mix of income from construction and government rewards and penalties. The higher the sum of receipts is, the more stable the contractor's decision to participate in GBs is. When the government gives better incentive measures to the contractor, it is easier for the government, the developer, and the contractor to form an unanimous decision on the GB strategy, so the development dynamic system of GB is more stable.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Li, X. (2022). Evolutionary Game Analysis of Green Building Development Dynamic System under Government Regulation: From the Perspective of the Contractor. Mathematical Problems in Engineering, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1155/2022/1987229

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free