Under Xi Jinping, the Chinese Communist Party has dramatically expanded its use of inspections (巡视). Existing scholarship largely portrays inspections as an anti-corruption mechanism. However, based on an examination of hundreds of post-inspection reports from party organs, provincial and municipal governments, central state-owned enterprises, and other institutions, this article argues that while inspections initially focused on curbing corruption, in recent years the Xi administration has used them to advance a wide range of governance objectives. Besides curbing corruption, inspections also promote organizational management reforms, improve policy implementation, support party-building measures, and monitor loyalty to the party leadership. The article’s findings help resolve a puzzle about the Xi era: how does the Xi administration simultaneously pursue both power centralization and more effective governance?.
Carothers, C., & Zhang, Z. (2022). From Corruption Control to Everything Control: The Widening Use of Inspections in Xi’s China. Journal of Contemporary China. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2022.2071885