The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games

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Abstract

In this paper we analyze ternary bicooperative games, which are a refinement of the concept of a ternary voting game introduced by Felsenthal and Machover. Furthermore, majority voting rules based on the difference of votes are simple bicooperative games. First, we define the concepts of the defender and detractor swings for a player. Next, we introduce the Banzhaf power index and the normalized Banzhaf power index. The main result of the paper is an axiomatization of the Banzhaf power index for the class of ternary bicooperative games. Moreover, we study ternary bicooperative games with two lists of weights and compute the Banzhaf power index using generating functions. © 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Bilbao, J. M., Fernández, J. R., Jiménez, N., & López, J. J. (2010). The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games. Discrete Applied Mathematics, 158(9), 967–980. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2010.02.007

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