Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”*

Citations of this article
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text


This study explores the effect of bonus incentive mechanisms with a focus on how such a scheme influences aggregate production levels of teams of workers, specifically. We identify this using data from a highly competitive setting in professional sport, which involves a unique tournament design rule in an elite European rugby competition. The modelling results demonstrate qualified evidence that introducing bonuses to encourage teams to score via the most-difficult, highest-reward mode, incentivizes teams to increase effort to earn the bonus, and without reducing production after the bonus is achieved.

Author supplied keywords




Butler, R., Lenten, L. J. A., & Massey, P. (2020). Bonus incentives and team effort levels: Evidence from the “Field”*. Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 67(5), 539–550.

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free