Richard Pring’s View of Education as a Moral Practice

Abstract

Richard Pring (1938–2024) was the first holder of a Chair in Education at the University of Oxford and the Editor of the present journal from 1986 to 2001. This article pays tribute to his legacy in the field of educational philosophy. After reviewing briefly some well-known recurring themes in Pring’s educational philosophy, such as his busting of ‘false dualisms’, the article focuses on his specific view of education (and teaching) as a moral practice. This view is considered both in light of his more general conception of the aims of education and his latter-day writings about moral or character education more specifically. The article elicits the novelty of Pring’s position, especially in some of his less discussed works, and highlights his lasting legacy as a stalwart of early academic philosophy of education in the U.K. The article confirms Pring’s self-ascription as a Deweyan, albeit exclusively in the context of Dewey’s more systematic writing. However, Pring brought a unique take to most of the topics he discussed, defying any simplistic identification with a specific school of educational or philosophical thought.