Institutional conformity, entrepreneurial governance and local contingency: Problematizing central-local dynamics in localizing China's low-income housing policy

Abstract

Central-local dynamics are crucial to understand the implementation of China’s reform policies and regional economic development. Until recently, the research has focused on either end of the political spectrum, celebrating the top-down channeling of neoliberal-like reforms led by the central government or detailing the bottom-up process of policy innovation and entrepreneurism centred on local states. Knowledge is not substantial about how the central state interacts with local authorities in the localization of central public policies and, to a lesser extent, why some policies are properly implemented at the local level but others not. Through investigating the implementation of major national low-income housing policies in Chengdu and Shanghai, we interrogate three proposed theoretical constructs: political conformity, entrepreneurial governance and local contingency. Results show that institutional conformity manifests in cross-scale consistency in policy goals, political obligation of local states to conform to the central authority, and balance between local incentives and central state sanctions. In the process of balancing local and central interests, the local development priorities are framed along the line of local state entrepreneurism favoring fiscal responsibility, economic efficiency, and economic growth. Finally, locally contingent factors often interact with and mediate external forces and have a significant impact on localizing public policies in China.