Enhancing political representation in Lebanese confessionalism: Toward a randomly selected senate in power-sharing states

Abstract

Under the current confessional system, representative democracy in Lebanon suffers from a double crisis. At the institutional level, the prolonged presidential and cabinet vacancies combined with the slowness of the governmental machine reveal a considerable efficiency deficit. At the structural level, the current electoral representative system increasingly supports the organization of an oligarchic Lebanese regime where the concentration of power in a small number of people serves to benefit the interests of the confessional political elite. In this paper, I consider the establishment of a randomly selected senate as an alternative political answer to the crisis facing representative democracy in Lebanon. I identify the structural and political inadequacies of one of the dominant proposed resolutions, the “referendum solution,” to deal with the current representative crisis. I argue that the introduction of sortition in Lebanese political procedures could be considered an evolution toward further deliberative democratization of the system.