Más allá del reloj como modelo del ser vivo: La distinción máquina natural y máquina artificial en Leibniz

Abstract

During the seventeenth century, the clock seems the most appropriate model for thinking about living beings. The German philosopher G. W. Leibniz (1646-1716), is part of the mechanical tradition that conceives living beings from the clock or the automata's model, but he establishes an essential distinction between natural and artificial machines. This distinction shows the limits of the mechanical model. The machines of nature are infinitely complex machines, machines within machines ad infinitum; the artificial machines, instead, reach a limit of complexity. This distinction forces us to go beyond the clock as a model of living beings, because this model is insufficient to understand the dynamics of living beings, in at least two aspects: a) it is not able to explain the origin of the living being's structure or form; b) it does not establish an internal principle of activity grounding the living being's dynamic and structural unit. With his notion of organism or natural machine, Leibniz tries to solve these insufficiencies of the purely mechanical model: a) in his proposal, the living being is not constituted mechanically or serially, but at once, by an act of creation; b) the conservation of the living being in time is only understandable from a principle of intrinsic activity that provides unity, activity and structure to living beings.