This paper deals with the problems of optimal capacity and pricing decisions in private road networks. These problems are described as a class of design and pricing Stackelberg games and formulated as nonconvex, bilevel nonlinear programs. Such games capture interactions among the decisions of system designer/operator, government regulations and reactions of multi-class users on optimal toll-capacity combinations. The present class of games applies to a realistic urban highway with untolled alternative arterial links. In contrast with the mostly used continuous representations, the highway capacity is more intuitively expressed as a discrete variable, which further complicates the solution procedure. Hence, an evolutionary computing approach is employed to provide a stochastic global search of the optimal toll and capacity choices. The results offer valuable insights into how investment and pricing strategies can be deployed in regulated private road networks. © 2008 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg.
CITATION STYLE
Dimitriou, L., Tsekeris, T., & Stathopoulos, A. (2008). Genetic computation of road network design and pricing stackelberg games with multi-class users. In Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics) (Vol. 4974 LNCS, pp. 669–678). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-540-78761-7_73
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