In France, main companies nurture a high number of interlocking directorates. We run descriptive analyses on the 125 largest capitalizations at the Paris Stock Exchange, in order to highlight the economic and social factors driving this phenomenon. On the one hand, the governance network reflects a preference among directors of the same profile, suggesting a mechanism of bounded solidarity. On the other hand, it is included in the capital network, whose major shareholders are mostly foreign investors. We argue that the cohesion of corporate networks based on interlocks might decrease during next years. © 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
Comet, C., & Pizarro, N. (2011). The cohesion of intercorporate networks in France. In Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences (Vol. 10, pp. 52–61). Elsevier Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2011.01.008