This article examines the interplay between gendered electoral financing (GEF) and other crucial factors in democratic elections worldwide to determine whether, how, and why these understudied mechanisms help achieve gender balance in national parliaments. Integrating qualitative comparative analysis and minimalist causal mechanism case studies, the sequential mixed methods study of GEF implementation in 31 elections in 17 countries shows that enhanced gender balance is achieved when GEF is combined with several conditions, providing a much-needed financial incentive - payments and penalties - for party gatekeepers and eligible women to change their behavior. In successful cases of top-down GEF implementation, gender quotas combine with a PR electoral system or a 15% minimum of women MPs, a measure developed for this study. Success in bottom-up GEF implementation is unexpected and complex and occurs without a quota. The article ends with a discussion of the research agenda, policy recommendations, and implications for the pursuit of democratic quality.
CITATION STYLE
Muriaas, R., Mazur, A. M. Y. G., & Hoard, S. (2022). Payments and Penalties for Democracy: Gendered Electoral Financing in Action Worldwide. American Political Science Review, 116(2), 502–515. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055421000976
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