Minimalismo schumpeteriano, teoria econômica da democracia e escolha racional

Abstract

Democracy is one of the most widely-discussed themes in Political Science. There is unanimous agreement regarding the legitimacy of the democratic regime in the face of those that oppose it. Nonetheless, if there is consensus on the defense of democracy, there is no analogous consensus regarding what the concept really means. Debate on the theme re-emerges as a consequence of the crisis of political representation in countries where democracy has been consolidated, of the fall of authoritarian regimes in eastern Europe, Asia and Latin America and the incertainties surrounding consolidation of democratic regimes. This article analyzes some of the inflections that are present in democratic theory, particularly on issues that involve the relationship between democracy, the logic of collective action, political representation, interest and accountability. We begin by presenting Max Weber's influence on Joseph Schumpeter's theory of democracy, followed by the bases of his minimalism, his influence on Robert Dahl's pluralism, the paradoxes of the logic of collective action and of economic theory of democracy. We then go on to particular aspects of concepts of political representation, responsibility, interest, forming of preferences and general will. We find that the meaning of political representation has become increasingly complex, particularly because its practice has not been consonant with the "ideal of popular representation in politics" that is characteristic of democratic utopia. There is a clear hiatus between the demand for more representation and how in fact the latter materializes within society. Nonetheless, we argue that, notwithstanding all the criticisms it has received, democracy as a system of government survives under different social and historical conditions and this happens because all democratic regimes share one common feature: representative institutions. Without them, democracy is a mere fiction.