A modified vickrey auction with regret minimization for uniform alliance decisions

0Citations
Citations of this article
7Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

You may have access to this PDF.

Abstract

We consider a supply chain management problem where a business alliance of small capacity retailers needs to collectively select a unique supplier considering the assignment’s efficiency at both the alliance and retailers’ level. We model the alliance as a multi-agent system. For this model, we present a modified Vickrey auction algorithm with regret minimization and compare it experimentally with aggregation of preferences by voting and standard Vickrey auction. Through simulation, we show that the proposed method on average reaches globally efficient and individually acceptable solutions. The solutions are evaluated in terms of different social welfare values.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Lujak, M., & Slavkovik, M. (2017). A modified vickrey auction with regret minimization for uniform alliance decisions. Studies in Computational Intelligence, 737, 61–72. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66379-1_6

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free