Wittgenstein: about the form of a philosophical problem

Abstract

Wittgenstein argues that philosophical problems are illegitimate. It is not clear, however, what is generally meant by a philosophical problem, and what is its nature. This article attempts to elucidate Wittgenstein’s observation that a form of a philosophical problem can be presented with the expression “I don’t know my way about” (PI § 123). The article chooses, as an example, the Kantian scandal, which demands that we prove by the use of reason that the proposition “there are physical objects” is true. Without renouncing the example, the article explores how Wittgenstein’s expression adequately characterizes the very nature of philosophical difficulty. The exercise uses, first, formal recommendations from the Tractatus, second, therapies deployed in On Certainty, and, finally, the resource of distinguishing between the primary and secondary sense of an expression insinuated in the Philosophical Investigations.