A dynamic game of waste management

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The paper studies a differential game of waste management (disposal). Each of three neighbouring regions is endowed with a stock of waste, but no additional waste is generated in any region and waste does not decay from natural reasons. A region's stock of waste can be reduced only by dumping on its neighbours. The model features two externalities: a strategic externality caused by the fact that the payoff of a coalition depends on the actions of players outside the coalition, and a stock externality caused by the fixed overall amount of waste. The game has a finite time horizon and it is shown that intertemporal core-theoretic cooperation can be sustained under intuitive conditions. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.




Jørgensen, S. (2010). A dynamic game of waste management. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34(2), 258–265. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2009.09.005

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