Model analysis of smart supply chain finance of platform-based enterprises under government supervision

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has made it more difficult and expensive for medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to finance. In this context, relying on the network platform, smart supply chain finance effectively solves financing problems for small and SMEs. However, in the development of smart supply chain finance, there are still some problems such as unstable willingness of SMEs to participate in financing, difficulty in determining the optimal development mode of platform-based core enterprises and lack of appropriate regulatory measures. Based on whether the network platform can use its own capitals for lending, this study introduces two smart supply chain financial models (the dominant and cooperation models of platform-based core enterprises) to solve the above problems. In this study, we construct two evolutionary game models: the tripartite model, including government, platform-based core enterprises, and SMEs, and the quadrilateral model, including government, financial institutions, platform-based core enterprises, and SMEs. This study presents the evolution and stability strategies of each participant under different modes. In addition, we discuss the willingness of platforms to choose different modes and corresponding government supervision measures. This study offers several important conclusions. (1) Core enterprises that do not have the conditions to build a highly intelligent platform choose the cooperation model; otherwise, they will preferentially choose the dominant mode. (2) Under the dominant mode, the stable development of smart supply chain finance must rely on strict government supervision. (3) By adjusting the scope of tax rates and subsidies, the government can control the trend of mutual transformation of the two modes, so that the dominant mode and the cooperative mode can develop in a balanced way in the market.