Why the West’s alternative to China’s international infrastructure financing is failing

Abstract

As geopolitical rivalry intensifies, Western states have moved to compete with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, the mobilisation of funds for global infrastructure remains paltry, suggesting that Western states cannot contest Chinese dominance here. Why? Through comparative political economy analysis of China and the United States, we argue that serious competition cannot be willed into being by state managers thinking geostrategically. States’ strengths and weaknesses are rooted in structural political economy dynamics. Where state managers’ plans jibe with, or express, the interests of powerful social forces and the capital and productive forces they command, a powerful impact results. This is true of China, whose BRI is principally a spatio-temporal fix for industrial overcapacity and over-accumulated capital. Conversely, where geopolitical ambitions are divorced from powerful groups’ interests and material realities, results are lacklustre. This applies to the United States, characterised by infrastructural decay, industrial hollowing-out and a dominant financial sector largely disinterested in infrastructure. Although US state managers are turning towards increased state spending on domestic infrastructure, internationally, the West’s continued neoliberal approach still relies on the already-failed approach of mobilising private capital into infrastructure investment.