Is There Room for Animals in John Rawls's Political Philosophy?

Abstract

What role do nonhuman animals play in John Rawls's political philosophy? In this article, I identify three possible answers to this question. According to the integrationist view, animals can be included within Rawls's theory of justice, as genuine subjects of justice. On the compatibilist approach, animals cannot be included within Rawls's theory of justice, but they can nonetheless be incorporated into other aspects of his broader political theory. Finally, the conflict view holds that there is a tension between recognizing the moral status of nonhuman animals and certain fundamental elements of Rawls's political thought. The main goal of this paper is to defend this third view. First, I argue that the main attempts to integrate animals within Rawls' theory of justice fail, as they end up contradicting some important elements of the theory. Second, I also argue that the compatibilist strategy is unsatisfactory, as it proves incapable of incorporating certain assumptions widely shared among animal ethicists.