The impact of interplay between formal and informal institutions on corporate governance systems: A comparative study of CEECs

Abstract

The central point of this paper is to present the results of comparative case study research concerning the impact of the interplay between formal and informal institutions in the corporate governance systems (CGS) of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Particular focus was put on the values of the corporate governance codes (CGC) of CEECs, as well as on transparent ownership structures, transactions with related parties, the protection of minority shareholders, independent members of supervisory boards, and separation between the CEO position and the chairman of the board of directors. The main subject of interest concerns two research areas: the character of the relationship between formal and informal institutions, as well as whether the interplay between them is relevant to the CGSs of CEECs. Moreover, the author investigates whether the CGCs of CEECs consist of regulations that are compatible with the values set up in preambles using research methods such as individual case study or deductive reasoning. The conclusion presented in the paper was drawn on the basis of a review of the literature and research on national and European corporate governance regulations, as well as the CGC of CEECs. The primary contribution this article makes is to advance the stream of research beyond any single country setting, and to link the literature on the interplay between formal and informal institutions related to CGSs in a broad range of economies in transition ('catch up' countries) like CEECs. This paper provides an understanding of how the interplay between formal and informal institutions may influence the CGCs of CEECs.