Estimating Extensive Form Games in R

  • Kenkel B
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Abstract

This article introduces new software, the game package, for estimating strategic statistical models in R. In these models, the probability distribution over outcomes corresponds to the equilibrium of an underlying game form. We review such models and provide derivations for one example, including discussion of alternative motivations for the stochastic component of the models. We introduce the basic functionality of the games package, package implements maximum likelihood estimation for the most commonly used models of strategic choice, including three extensive form games and an ultimatum bargaining model. The software also includes functions for bootstrapping, plotting fitted values with their confidence intervals, performing non-nested model comparisons, and checking global convergence failures. We use the new software to replicate Leblang's (2003) analysis of speculative currency attacks.

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APA

Kenkel, B. (University of R. C. S. S. (University of R. (2014). Estimating Extensive Form Games in R. Journal of Statistical Software, 56(8).

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