Should Medical Experts Giving Evidence in Criminal Trials Adhere to EFNSI Forensic Guidelines in Evaluative Reporting

Abstract

Miscarriages of justice led to concerns that forensic science reports were prosecution-biassed and led to elementary errors of probability. The European Network of Forensic Science Institutes (EFNSI) and other institutes developed standards requiring reporting of the probability of evidence under all hypotheses (usually prosecution and defence hypotheses) with the likelihood ratio (LR). (Formula presented.) values > 1, being probative for a prosecution hypothesis. In elementary two-variable conditional probability theory (Baye’s theorem), the LR is also an updating factor which multiplies the odds of guilt for each item of evidence considered. Although this is not true for multiple-variable probability theory, the value of the LR as a valid measure of evidential probity remains. Forensic scientists are experts in evidence and should not stray into the role of the Court to consider the probability of the hypotheses given the totality of the evidence: (Formula presented.) Medical experts may be required to assist the court with diagnoses (the hypothesis), but this privilege is balanced by vigilance that experts do not stray beyond their expertise. A narrow interpretation of expertise hinders the evaluation of the evidence under hypotheses adjacent to the area of expertise. This paradox may be overcome by experts declaring competence in areas adjacent to their main area of expertise. Regulatory bodies do not currently require medical experts to adhere to EFNSI guidelines in evaluative reporting. Legal opinion is divided on whether probability theory can be applied to cases requiring medical expertise. Medical experts should, in their reports, clearly separate evaluating the probability of the evidence (where evaluative reporting should apply) and evaluating the probability of hypotheses where methodology should be prioritised over opinion. The reckless misapplication of elementary probability theory, typically transposing conditional probabilities or neglecting prior odds, may lead to the jury being misled into believing posterior odds of guilt are many orders of magnitude greater than reality. Medical experts should declare training in elementary probability theory. Inaccurate probabilities are a joint enterprise between all who inform or advise the jury, so all must be trained in elementary probability theory.