The buyer-supplier social contract: Information sharing as a deterrent to unethical behaviors

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to focus on the role of information sharing as a deterrent to unethical behavior in a buyer-supplier relationship. The authors investigate the broader supplier network, examining information sharing as it occurs through both the buyer-supplier structure as well as supplier-supplier structures. The authors propose that buyer-supplier and supplier-supplier information sharing serve to reduce perceived buying firm unethical behavior while at the same time fostering increased commitment and satisfaction in long-term buyer-supplier relationships. Design/methodology/approach: The relational model presented is grounded in the theory of social contract. The authors' hypotheses are tested using structural equation modeling with survey data collected from supplier firms from a wide range of industries and that have been involved long-term (minimum of five years) in the provision of goods and/or services with their buying firm. Findings: The authors demonstrate that perceived buying firm unethical behavior goes beyond the nature of the dyadic buyer-supplier relationship; the supplier's entire structure of contacts facilitates the flow of information regarding a buying firm. Originality/value: This research contributes to the operations and supply chain management literatures by adopting a more comprehensive view of the networks involved in relationship management efforts than what has typically been evaluated in these literatures. © Emerald Group Publishing Limited.