A theory of noninterference for the π-calculus

Abstract

We develop a theory of noninterference for a typed version of the π-calculus where types are used to assign secrecy levels to channels. We provide two equivalent characterizations of noninterference based on a typed behavioural equivalence relative to a security level σ, which captures the idea of external observers of level σ. The first characterization involves a universal quantification over all the possible active attacks, i.e., malicious processes which interact with the system possibly leaking secret information. The second definition of noninterference is expressed in terms of an unwinding condition, which deals with so-called passive attacks trying to infer confidential information just by observing the behaviour of the system. This unwinding-based characterization naturally leads to efficient methods for the verification and construction of (compositional) secure systems. Furthermore, we characterize noninterference in terms of bisimulation-like (partial) equivalence relations in the style of a stream of similar studies for other process calculi (e.g., CCS and CryptoSPA) and languages (e.g., imperative and multi-threaded languages). © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2005.