Geopolitics and Genocide: Patron Interests, Client Crises, and Realpolitik

Abstract

Genocide is a catastrophic event in international relations. States that experience genocide often have powerful external patrons that influence its likelihood. Yet, the external dynamics of genocide are often overlooked. This paper examines the constraining or enabling role of external patrons and what motivates their decisions. This research theorizes that patron states can permit or restrain genocide, depending on their interests in the client state. The study uses a qualitative comparative case analysis to focus on the role of patron military assistance, comparing genocide in Rwanda (1990-1994), and the role of France with the high-risk non-genocide in Nagorno-Karabakh (1991-1994) and Russian support to Armenia. I argue that patron actions can be understood through the prism of great or regional power competition and are generally determined by motivations conforming to a logic of realpolitik; the prospect of loss of influence significantly affects the likelihood of genocide. These processes can be observed through variations in patron military assistance and patterns of violence. A better understanding of these dynamics is critical to the study of international relations and international security, with policy implications for atrocity prevention in a period of intensifying great power competition.