Enhancing auditors’ professional skepticism through nudges: an eye-tracking experiment

Abstract

This article studies whether nudges–that is, gentle alterations of people’s behaviour–increase audit quality. Although the utility of nudges is well-established in behavioural sciences, their applicability and efficacy have been less studied in accounting and auditing. To bridge this knowledge gap, the study extends nudge theory to financial audits, offering experimental evidence of the impact of social norms and justification nudges on auditor behaviour. A factorial 2 × 2 between-subject experiment (social norms and justification) shows that nudges amplify professional skepticism, a critical indicator of audit quality. A follow-up eye-tracking experiment involving an audit task identifies the underlying cognitive mechanism of this effect; nudges heighten auditors’ visual attention to pertinent information, thereby refining their evaluations of audit evidence and increasing their professional skepticism.