Glorification of Terrorist Violence at the European Court of Human Rights

Abstract

This article examines the European Court of Human Rights' approach towards restrictions on expression glorifying terrorist violence. This is done by situating the Court's case law against two objections to respective criminal offences: their inherent overbreadth and their incompatibility with the restraining demands of the 'harm principle'. In doing so, the article discusses how the 'harm principle' relates to the proportionality test and how the Court's categorisation of expression glorifying violence responds to the objection of overbreadth. In arguing that the tool of categorisation has not been determinative in driving the outcomes in relevant decisions, the article suggests that engaging the existence of a competing public interest and reviewing the admissibility of reasons for such restrictions would appropriately elevate the Convention standard. Finally, the article argues that inconsistencies across decisions are best explained by the Court's deference-giving practices, particularly in cases involving claims about the recency of terrorist violence.