Intersubjective, systemic, and sensory roots of autistic social difficulties: a critical evaluation of enactivist and phenomenological approaches

Abstract

Despite some remarkable accomplishments, enactivist and phenomenological approaches to autistic social difficulties remain highly problematic. Their conceptualization of social disablement as a disturbance of our pre-reflective understanding of others is promising and constitutes a better explanation than Theory of Mind. However, more care is needed when it comes to analyzing the causes of such disturbance. This article argues that any account of autistic social cognition that aims to provide an accurate picture should engage with the following three roots of autistic social difficulties: (1) intersubjective differences, (2) systemic discrimination and (3) sensory modulation. This article also examines how established literature has approached these causes, what limitations it presents and how more recent enactivist and phenomenological perspectives are overcoming them. Suggestions on how such three roots should be studied follow from this analysis. Firstly, I contend that intersubjective differences act as a source of difficulties for both autistic and non-autistic people, as already stated by the double-empathy problem (Milton in Disabil Soc 27(6):883–887, 2012). Additionally, I show that the systemic exclusion of autistic embodiment from participatory sense-making must be analyzed as the result of power dynamics and not as stemming from mere atypicality. Finally, I detail how sensory/attentional modulation in autistic individuals interacts with the other two sources of social difficulties but should not be taken to be their cause. Overall, a nuanced perspective that includes the political, intersubjective, and sensory roots of autistic social disablement is presented as a necessary step towards creating better research and more inclusive practices.