BUDDHIST PHENOMENOLOGY AND THE PROBLEM OF ESSENCE

Abstract

In this paper, I intend to make a case for Buddhist phenomenology. By Buddhist phenomenology, I mean a phenomenological interpretation of Yogācāra's doctrine of consciousness. Yet, this interpretation will be vulnerable if I do not justify the way in which the anti-essentialistic Buddhist philosophy can countenance the Husserlian essence. I dub this problem of compatibility between Buddhist and phenomenology the "problem of essence". Nevertheless, I argue that this problem will not jeopardize Buddhist phenomenology because: (1) Yogācārins, especially later Yogācārins represented by Xuan Zang do not articulate emptiness as a negation but as an affirmation of the existent; (2) Husserl's phenomenological essence is not a substance that Yogācārins reject but the ideal sense (Sinn) that Yogācārins also stress. After resolving the problem of essence, I formulate Buddhist phenomenology as follows: on the epistemological level, it describes intentional acts of consciousness; on the meta-epistemological level, it entails transcendental idealism.