Control-by-design? Autonomous weapons systems as technopolitical projects

Abstract

This article critically examines the control-by-design imaginary in the development of autonomous weapons systems (AWS): the belief that technical safeguards and human ingenuity can resolve the risks they pose. Adopting a technopolitical lens, it conceptualizes AWS design as a heterogeneous process shaped by technical, institutional, and political forces. The analysis highlights two key practices: encoding target profiles and determining and validating error rates. It argues that control-by-design remains partial and fragile, yet is temporarily stabilized through design and testing processes that translate political and military judgments about legitimate targets and acceptable error into classificatory models and performance thresholds, creating provisional assurances of control. However, this imaginary is continually unsettled by the dynamics of military innovation—geopolitical competition, institutional pressures for speed and advantage, and operational demands—that sideline legal and ethical concerns. Moreover, AWS operate in dynamic, adversarial environments that destabilize pre-encoded classifications and risk-based testing, evaluation, verification, and validation.