Exemplar-based judgment or direct recall: On a problematic procedure for estimating parameters in exemplar models of quantitative judgment

Abstract

Exemplar models are often used in research on multiple-cue judgments to describe the underlying process of participants’ responses. In these experiments, participants are repeatedly presented with the same exemplars (e.g., poisonous bugs) and instructed to memorize these exemplars and their corresponding criterion values (e.g., the toxicity of a bug). We propose that there are two possible outcomes when participants judge one of the already learned exemplars in some later block of the experiment. They either have memorized the exemplar and their respective criterion value and are thus able to recall the exact value, or they have not learned the exemplar and thus have to judge its criterion value, as if it was a new stimulus. We argue that psychologically, the judgments of participants in a multiple-cue judgment experiment are a mixture of these two qualitatively distinct cognitive processes: judgment and recall. However, the cognitive modeling procedure usually applied does not make any distinction between these processes and the data generated by them. We investigated potential effects of disregarding the distinction between these two processes on the parameter recovery and the model fit of one exemplar model. We present results of a simulation as well as the reanalysis of five experimental data sets showing that the current combination of experimental design and modeling procedure can bias parameter estimates, impair their validity, and negatively affect the fit and predictive performance of the model. We also present a latent-mixture extension of the original model as a possible solution to these issues.