Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions

66Citations
Citations of this article
60Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

Experimental sealed-bid first-price auctions with private values in which feedback on the losing bids is provided yield lower revenues than auctions where this feedback is not given. The concept of weighted impulse balance equilibrium, which is based on a principle of ex-post rationality and incorporates a concern for social comparison, captures the data. © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Ockenfels, A., & Selten, R. (2005). Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions. Games and Economic Behavior, 51(1), 155–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free