Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

3Citations
Citations of this article
5Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
Get full text

Abstract

In this paper, we study the Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. We show that, with at least three agents, Maskin monotonicity is necessary and sufficient for implementation. We examine the implementability of various social choice correspondences (SCCs) in this environment, and prove that some well-known SCCs are Maskin monotonic (but they do not satisfy no-veto power) and hence Nash implementable. © 2013 by the author; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Doghmi, A. (2013). Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences. Games, 4(1), 38–49. https://doi.org/10.3390/g4010038

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free