Ownership and trade from evolutionary games

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Abstract

This article describes how ownership status serves as a natural asymmetrizing criterion enabling resolution of property conflicts. Two new evolutionary game models are presented where ownership and trade emerge from anarchy as evolutionary stable strategies. © 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Yee, K. K. (2003). Ownership and trade from evolutionary games. International Review of Law and Economics, 23(2), 183–197. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(03)00026-7

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