Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria

  • Kjell H
N/ACitations
Citations of this article
1Readers
Mendeley users who have this article in their library.

Abstract

A game with multiple equilibria and incomplete information, which allows for reputation building, is repeated infinitely many times. Increasing differences in patience contribute to a greater likelihood of cooperation. As one player becomes sufficiently more patient than the other player, both players benefit, and both players' risk limits, and the conflict between the players, decrease.

Cite

CITATION STYLE

APA

Kjell, H. (2007). Reputation, incomplete information, and differences in patience in repeated games with multiple equilibria. Economics Letters, 97(2), 138–144. Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176507000717

Register to see more suggestions

Mendeley helps you to discover research relevant for your work.

Already have an account?

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free