Study on the Oil Import/Export Quota Allocation Mechanism in China by Using a Dynamic Game-Theoretic Model

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Abstract

With the rapid progress of oil market reform in China, independent refineries (small companies) get more and more oil import/export quotas, which will bring big impacts on the whole market and society. However, whether the impacts are positive or negative is highly dependent on the quota allocation mechanism and prices in global/domestic market markets. Therefore, in the present study, considering the game relationships among the six agents including state-owned companies, independent refineries, domestic and foreign oil product consumers, and domestic and foreign crude oil producers, in order to calculate the detailed impacts, a game-theoretic analysis model was developed. The impacts of different quota mechanism are analyzed and compared, and the optimal quota mechanism in different price scenarios is obtained based on the developed model.

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Chen, S., Li, M., Zhang, Q., & Li, H. (2017). Study on the Oil Import/Export Quota Allocation Mechanism in China by Using a Dynamic Game-Theoretic Model. In Energy Procedia (Vol. 105, pp. 3856–3861). Elsevier Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2017.03.788

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