Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games

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Abstract

The paradigm of randomly-furcating stochastic differential games incorporates additional stochastic elements via randomly branching payoffs in stochastic differential games. This paper considers dynamically stable cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Analytically tractable payoff distribution procedures contingent upon specific random realizations of the state and payoff structure are derived. This new approach widens the application of cooperative differential game theory to problems where the evolution of the state and future environments are not known with certainty. Important cases abound in regional economic cooperation, corporate joint ventures and environmental control. An illustration in cooperative resource extraction is presented. © 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Petrosyan, L. A., & Yeung, D. W. K. (2007). Subgame-consistent cooperative solutions in randomly furcating stochastic differential games. Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 45(11–12), 1294–1307. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mcm.2006.11.003

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