A two-sided reputation result with long-run players

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Abstract

We establish reputation results, under two sided incomplete information, for a class of repeated games. We consider a repeated game that satisfies the assumptions of either Atakan and Ekmekci (2012) [3] or Cripps et al. (2005) [6] and we assume that both players are Stackelberg types with positive probability. If the stage game is not a common interest game, then equilibrium play converges to the unique equilibrium of a continuous time war of attrition as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. Alternatively, if the stage game is a common-interest game, then the players' equilibrium payoffs converge to their highest payoffs as the stage game is repeated arbitrarily frequently. © 2012 Elsevier Inc.

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Atakan, A. E., & Ekmekci, M. (2013). A two-sided reputation result with long-run players. Journal of Economic Theory, 148(1), 376–392. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.12.007

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