Asymmetric punishments for group deviations in the infinitely repeated Cournot model

  • Aramendia M
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Abstract

We define in-and-out strategies which care about group deviations in a noncooperative way in the setting of infinitely repeated symmetric Cournot models with discounting. The subgame perfect equilibrium folk theorem holds when it is restricted to these strategies. © 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Deviations
  • Infinitely repeated games

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Authors

  • Miguel Aramendia

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