A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games

  • Curiel I
  • 1


    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 5


    Citations of this article.


Weights are attached to the coalitions of a finite set of players in order to reflect the fact that some coalitions are more likely to be formed than others. A new power index for simple games which depends only on these weights and the minimal winning coalitions of a game is introduced. Two axiomatic characterizations of this index are given. Symmetry, dummy player and quarrel properties of the index are treated. Two special forms of the index arising from certain assumptions about the weights are described. © 1987.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Simple game
  • lotteries
  • mergeable
  • mixture space
  • symmetry property
  • utility functions

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document


  • Imma J. Curiel

Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free