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Weights are attached to the coalitions of a finite set of players in order to reflect the fact that some coalitions are more likely to be formed than others. A new power index for simple games which depends only on these weights and the minimal winning coalitions of a game is introduced. Two axiomatic characterizations of this index are given. Symmetry, dummy player and quarrel properties of the index are treated. Two special forms of the index arising from certain assumptions about the weights are described. © 1987.




Curiel, I. J. (1987). A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games. Mathematical Social Sciences, 13(2), 141–152. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90051-5

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