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Regulators increasingly rely upon incentive regulation as a substitute or refinement of traditional cost of service regulation. Focusing on incentive regulation in the US utility industry, this article first identifies four desirable attributes for incentive mechanisms. It develops a taxonomy of the types of mechanisms that are available, identifies the issues that arise in the design and evaluation of these mechanisms, and then closes with a discussion of the risks associated with various mechanisms. © 1995.




Pfeifenberger, J. P., & Tye, W. B. (1995). Handle with care. A primer on incentive regulation. Energy Policy, 23(9), 769–779. https://doi.org/10.1016/0301-4215(95)00067-S

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