This paper examines rules that map preference profiles into choice sets. There are no agendas other than the entire set of alternatives. A rule is said to be "manipulable" if there is a person i, and a preference profile, such that i prefers the choice set obtained when he is dishonest to the one obtained when he is honest. It is "nonmanipulable" if this can never happen. The paper indicates how preferences over choice sets might be sensibly derived from preferences over alternatives, and discusses seven different notions of manipulability associated with seven different assumptions about preferences over sets of alternatives. The paper has two sections of results. In the first I show that the Pareto rule, that is, the rule that maps preference profiles into corresponding sets of Pareto optima, is nonmanipulable in four of the seven senses of manipulability, and manipulable in three of them. In the second section, I examine this conjecture: If an arbitrary rule is nonmanipulable and nonimposed, and if indifference is disallowed, then every choice set must be contained in the set of Pareto optima. The conjecture is true under the strongest definition of nonmanipulability. © 1979.
Feldman, A. (1979). Manipulation and the Pareto rule. Journal of Economic Theory, 21(3), 473–482. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90053-X