Semantical models for intuitionistic logics

  • López-Escobar E
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Abstract

It is ironic that intuitionism, whose origins are rooted in the concept of “proofs”, should produce so many (apparently) different kinds of models: Kripke models, Beth models, topological models, realizability, Swart models, and so on. Furthermore there appears to be a general view that most of the modellings are equivalent, although occasionally it is observed that they are not! In this talk we consider the concept of an abstract semantics for a logic L which we believe satisfies the minimum requirements in order to be called a “truth-value semantics” for L. We then discuss possible notions of equivalence between different semantics for L and in particular we catalogue just about all the truth-value semantics for intuitionistic logic and some of its extensions. We conclude with a Beth-like modelling for the extension CD (constant domains) of intuitionistic logic. © 1980, North-Holland Publishing Company.

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Authors

  • E. G.K. López-Escobar

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