Tax reporting game under uncertain tax laws and asymmetric information

  • Jung W
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This study models a game played by a tax enforcement agency and a taxpayer who is only partially informed about her true taxable income due to complexity of tax laws. A signalling equilibrium is shown to exist in which the taxpayer's report is monotone increasing in her private information about taxable income. Investigated also is the effect of changes in uncertainty on reporting decisions and the agency's expected revenue. © 1991.

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  • Woon Oh Jung

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