Unions and strategic managerial incentives

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Abstract

This paper shows how strategic managerial incentives weaken union power at Cournot-Nash duopoly equilibrium, although, because of a prisoner's dilemma, unions are not averse to those contracts. Thus, one should question whether oligopolists automatically maximize profits when bargaining with trade unions. © 1995.

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APA

Bughin, J. (1995). Unions and strategic managerial incentives. Economics Letters, 47(1), 95–100. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(94)00504-U

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