Agnosticism about moral responsibility

  • Byrd J
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Abstract

I examine the three main types of response to the 'direct argument' for incompatibilism, and I argue that the result of the debate over the argument is a dialectical stalemate. While others have reached a similar conclusion, I go on to argue that the implications of this stalemate have not been properly appreciated. I contend that, as a result of this stalemate, we should be prepared to accept agnosticism about moral responsibility: we simply do not know if anyone is ever morally responsible for anything.

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Authors

  • Jeremy Byrd

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