Asymmetric treatment of identical agents in teams

  • Bose A
  • Pal D
  • Sappington D
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Abstract

We investigate when identical agents will be treated asymmetrically in a simple team setting. Asymmetric treatment is optimal when the agents' individual contributions to team performance are strategic complements. Symmetric treatment of identical agents is optimal when the agents' contributions are strategic substitutes or when they are independent. © 2010 Elsevier B.V.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Asymmetric treatment
  • Moral hazard
  • Teams

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Authors

  • Arup Bose

  • Debashis Pal

  • David E.M. Sappington

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