Audited reputation

  • Xu H
  • Chen J
  • Whinston A
  • 10


    Mendeley users who have this article in their library.
  • 3


    Citations of this article.


We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882]. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Audit
  • Infinitely repeated game
  • Reputation

Get free article suggestions today

Mendeley saves you time finding and organizing research

Sign up here
Already have an account ?Sign in

Find this document


Cite this document

Choose a citation style from the tabs below

Save time finding and organizing research with Mendeley

Sign up for free