Audited reputation

  • Xu H
  • Chen J
  • Whinston A
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Abstract

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882]. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Author-supplied keywords

  • Audit
  • Infinitely repeated game
  • Reputation

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