Abstract
We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854-882]. © 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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APA
Xu, H., Chen, J., & Whinston, A. B. (2008). Audited reputation. Economics Letters, 100(3), 359–362. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.035
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